The SCR ends up looking good because of the efforts of many people. The Production staff under the direction of Jeff Larue, and all of the contributors listed on the Contents page all make the SCR possible. I think we (the SC membership) need to give serious consideration to Jeff's point about the feasibility of continuing the SCR in print. The shrinking member numbers make it difficult to maintain what I think is an absolutely essential part of the SC, the magazine. I also was disheartened by the drop off in activity on this site as well, although it has picked up somewhat recently. The only answer is for the membership to be more aggressive in mentioning the SubCommittee, recruiting members and holding activities. Otherwise this 20 year experiment in submarine hobby mania may end. I would hate to see that happen!
Since I was involved in both of the items you commented on, I wanted to respond. The Azorian book was itself a one year effort, coming off over a three year effort on researching & assembling the Azorian documentary film. The book and the film do not overlap significantly; they tell the story from somewhat different viewpoints. On behalf of the entire Azorian TeamI appreciate the very positive SCR review Romain Klaasen wrote. A few minor points to set the record straight on some items in the review. Specifically the questions he poses at the end of the review. The acoustic data (presented in the book) from AFTAC rules out a battery explosion as the cause of the K-129 loss. Second point, the lower gates on the moon pool were open during the entire recovery operation of lowering and raising the pipestring to which the CV was attached. Having an entire 1/3rd of your ship's structure open to the sea for days was an.....interesting experience, according to our interviewees. The two wingwalls on either side of the moon pool which connected the fore and aft structures were built to handle tremendous stresses of ship movement (with no traditional keel) during the operation. Finally the loss of most of the K-129 was due to several factors-the use of maraging steel (which is atrong but brittle at low temperatures) and on site decisions to offload additional weight on the CV to sink the CV arms and davits deeper into the bottom on either side of the K-129. This caused stress cracks in the arms, and later failure and loss of most of the forward section of the K-129 when the arms gave way. This is also illustrated quite nicely in a CGI sequence in the film. A final point is that USS Halibut was SSN/SSGN 587, not 586 (which was Triton), as in the review. It is listed as 587 in the book multiple times.
A separate point was your comment on the Guppy submarines. I have been playing with writing an extended article of the Guppy program and its role in the post WWII early Cold War. If there is additional interest, I would be happy to write a technical/historical article as I have done in the (not too distant) past on a number of submarine history topics. Maybe I better write it soon, as Jeff Larue's warning about the future of the SCR seemed somewhat ominous!